Hegemony and Tucker Carlson
Tucker Carlson is said to be an extremist, but until about half an hour ago most of his views were pretty mainstream
Everyone is talking about Tucker Carlson. And here, in 2 minutes of eloquence, he reminds us why: https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1651376097349578753
My purpose here is to talk not about Carlson but rather about the charge of extremism so frequently leveled at him. That charge tells us much about the hegemonic ideology, and more about the speed and direction of ideological change. Until very recently, much of what Carlson says would not have been considered extreme at all. I am not arguing that Carlson is right or wrong on this or that issue — I personally agree with him on some points but not others — but rather observing the location of his views with respect to what has been called the Overton window, which is to say his location on (or outside) the spectrum of social acceptability.
In Gramsci’s famous phrase, the hegemonic ideology determines what is taken for common sense. Just as hegemony tells us what good people may think, it also determines what is considered extremist, irresponsible or unacceptable. In the argot of the moment, departure from the realm of the acceptable is usually called racist, or hateful, or something-phobic, or white supremacist. (I wrote recently and at greater length about the expanding meanings of white supremacy.) Carlson is regularly accused of all of these ideological sins.
Most of Carlson’s views, now considered beyond the pale, were pretty normal not much more than half an hour ago. Here are five of his signature beliefs on a range of topics, from foreign policy to economics to culture:
Opposition to U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war;
Opposition to globalist economics;
Opposition to sexual performances in front of children;
Skepticism of the official January 6 “insurrection” narrative;
Support for border security, and opposition to illegal immigration.
Other issues could be suggested, but these capture a range that will illustrate my point: none of these positions would have been considered extreme or unacceptable — whether one agrees with them or not — ten years ago.
Running down the list, opposition to support for Ukraine does not make Carlson a Putin stooge any more than opposition to the Iraq invasion made those critics stooges of Saddam. Opposition to involvement in a foreign war has generally been considered a left-wing position. It has now become right-wing extremism. What is unusual today is the near-unanimity of elite and leftist support for Ukraine, as indicated by all those Ukrainian flag icons.
The explanation is not far to seek: hatred of Trump has driven most of the establishment to push the Russia hoax, in the process inflating Putin into a bogey capable of controlling elections in the United States. For entirely domestic reasons, the Democrats have spent the last seven years shouting about Putin, thereby turning themselves into the pro-war party, a reversal of normal patterns. Carlson’s position, with which I do not personally agree, is represented as evidence of extremism, though it is not so far from that of the Democrats as recently as the election of 2012.
Opposition to free trade deals and globalist economics, symbolized by the World Economic Forum, was also until very recently a leftwing position. Carlson’s position on trade resembles that of Bernie Sanders. The embrace by the WEF of “woke” cultural attitudes has played a large role in making opposition to globalism a conservative phenomenon.
My third point, the idea of sexual performances such as drag shows in front of children, was until the day before yesterday a topic that did not even exist. Anyone who had suggested that the gay rights movement was going in such a direction would have been dismissed as a right-wing paranoiac. But now we are told that middle-aged men disporting their sexual proclivities in front of children is perfectly normal, and that anyone who objects is a bigot. Such is the speed of ideological change.
Carlson’s opposition to the “insurrection” narrative of January 6, his concern for civil liberties, and his skepticism of official accounts would again not long ago have been considered more typical of the left than the right. But of course, the January 6 riot was a riot by the right, and that drove the left to forget its civil libertarianism. Civil liberties are normally the concern of those out of power, who most require their protection. The left senses, quite accurately, that they now enjoy state power. The draconian round-up of everybody and anybody who was near the Capitol on January 6 is an obvious abuse of state power and a travesty of justice. The left’s new “lock-em-up” attitude to law and order is a conspicuous change from its attitude to the BLM/Antifa riots of 2020. It leaves civil libertarianism to independent thinkers like Carlson, Glenn Greenwald, and Tulsi Gabbard.
The final issue I named above, immigration and border security, is the only one on the list where Carlson’s position would be conventionally considered right-wing. But before Trump, protecting the border was something both parties supported, at least verbally. The current situation of almost completely open borders was a far-left pipe dream until the Biden administration. Again, Carlson’s views are not new; it is their position on, or rather outside, the spectrum of the acceptable that has changed.
The fact that Carlson’s positions, accurately called populist and commanding wide popular support, were not considered extreme let alone cause for termination until very recently speaks of the distance, and also of the speed, with which the hegemonic ideology has moved.
Carlson gets to his heterodox positions, many long associated with the left, through cultural conservatism. His positions are not eclectic, quirky, or in any sense unsystematic. They flow from a deep attachment to a picture of an America out of Norman Rockwell: egalitarian, patriotic, culturally conservative, middle class, and centered around the traditional family. This is the America that the left hates, and the rest of us regret.
There have been for many years elite efforts to get Carlson canceled, among them successful advertiser boycotts organized by groups like Sleeping Giants. Whether or not these efforts played a role in his dismissal, they speak of the movement of corporate power (and of corporate opportunists), for so long conservative, to the cultural left.
Glenn Greenwald has praised Tucker Carlson for being one of few major journalists willing to criticize the security state, and argues that this is why Carlson faces such vociferous elite opposition. But Carlson faced efforts to get him canceled long before the Ukraine war, and long before January 6. While Carlson’s views on those issues certainly do not endear him to the state, it is the cultural issues that most upset his establishment critics. Carlson and his critics all agree with Andrew Breitbart: politics is downstream from culture.
As I began by observing, many of Carlson’s opinions were normal until quite recently. While they may be heterodox in their combination, none would have been considered extremist, racist, or otherwise beyond the pale, anywhere outside a sociology department. This speaks of rapid change. Given Carlson’s motivating concern for traditional values and traditional American culture, it also speaks of how thoroughly the hegemonic ideology has turned against those values and that culture. Self-hatred permeates the hegemonic ideology, and Carlson refuses to conform. That failure of conformity, and not any dispute about trade or the WEF or the Crimea, is why the left hates Tucker. That, and the fact that his nightly dissent was well phrased, direct, funny, and spoke to so many. Whether or not you agree with Carlson on any given issue, if you like America, you will like Tucker Carlson. But if you hate America, you will hate Carlson. The haters have won, for now, and that speaks of the hegemonic position of a woke America-hating ideology.